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JUDGMENTS - CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT AS AGAINST PERSONS LIABLE OvER To ORIGINAL DEFENDANT - APPLICABILITY To
CASES OF RESALE OF DEFECTIVE CHATTELS - M manufactures or
wholesales an article which he sells to retailer R, who in turn resells it
to consumer C. The article is defective, and C sues and recovers from
R on the ground of negligence, misrepresentation or breach of warranty,
for personal or other injuries received. If M can be sued in the same
jurisdiction as R, C may join Mas a defendant, in which case R may
be able to cross-claim against his co-defendant.1 Or if M is not sued, R
may be able to implead him.2 But, if M cannot be brought before the
same court, R, if he is to pass on the loss to M, must sue M in the
jurisdiction of the latter's residence, and will have the burden of
bringing C's witnesses in the first suit to M's jurisdiction and trying
the whole case over again against ]\II, with no assurance that the second
jury will find for him on the same proofs, though logically M must be
liable to R if R is liable to C.3 In this situation, will it avail R to give
to M notice and opportunity to defend the suit commenced by C? Will
he then be able to apply the doctrine that persons liable over to the
defendant in an action of which they are given notice are bound by the
1 See Weiner v. Mager & Throne, 167 Misc. 338, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1938),
relying on sec. 264 of the New York Civil Practice Act.
2 McSpedan v. Kunz, 271 N. Y. 131, 2 N. E. (2d) 513 (1936).
3 The obstacles encountered by the retailer in attempting to recover from the
manufacturer are discussed by Brown, "The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective
Food Products," 23 MINN, L. REv. 585 (1939), who considers them not so serious as
to afford a ground for denying to the consumer the right to recover from the retailer.
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judgment, whether they appear or not? 4 The paucity of cases shows
that this has seldom been tried, and the conflicting decisions on the
subject indicate that the answer to the question is not an easy one.5
The doctrine of res judicata against persons liable over who are
given notice and opportunity to defend has received frequent application to cases of indemnitors,0 reinsurers,7 parties to bills and notes,8
covenantors of title in warranty deeds,9 and cases where the parties
bore the relationship of principal and surety,1° master and servant,11
principal and agent,12 and landlord and tenant. ia While the rule has
been applied without exception to cases of breach of warranty of title
to chattels,14 it has apparently seldom been urged as applicable to other
warranties, such as warranties of soundness and merchantability, for
only five decisions can be found bearing on such questions.
Three early cases in which both suits were brought for breach of
warranty of soundness denied the application of res judicata. In the
4

The rule applies whenever the third person is liable over to the judgment debtor
with respect to the cause of action adjudicated, whether by express contract or by
operation of law. Bierce v. Waterhouse, 219 U. S. 320, 31 S. Ct. 241 (1910); E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) 297 F.
580; Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U. S. 418 (1863); Grand Forks v. Paulsness, 19 N. D.
293, 123 N. W. 878 (1909); Pezel v. Yerex, 56 Cal. App. 304, 205 P. 475 (1922);
Astoria v. Astoria & Columbia River R.R., 67 Ore. 538, 136 P. 645 (1913).
5
There are only five reported cases in point. One reason for the scarcity of
authority may be that in order to preserve his good will, keep his retail customers and
avoid giving notoriety to the accident, the manufacturer will usually repay the retailer
without questioning his right to recover, realizing also that defectiveness having been
established in one suit, it can in all probability be established again in a suit against him,
without the assistance of res judicata. See Brown, «The Liability of Retail Dealers for
Defective Food Products," 23 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1939).
6
Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. 1 (1865); Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Roehm,
215 Mich. 586, 184 N. W. 414 (1921).
7
Gantt v. American Central Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 503 (1878); Strong v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 289 (1876).
8
See 123 A. L. R. 1153 (1939); 34 A. L. R. 152 (1925).
9 Morgan v. Muldoon, 82 Ind. 347 (1882); Elliott v. Saufl.ey, 89 Ky. 52, II S.
W. 200 (1889); Brown v. Howen, 37 Vt. 439 (1865); St. Louis v. Bissell, 46 Mo.
157 (1870); Hovey v. Smith, 22 Mich. 170 (1871).
10
Hare v. Grant, 77 N. C. 203 (1877); Konitzky v. Meyer, 49 N. Y. 571
(1872).
11
Gilingham v. Charleston Tow-Boat & Transp. Co., (D. C. S. C. 1889) 40 F.
649.
12
Baynard v. Harrity, 6 Del. 200 (1856); Harvie v. Turner, 46 Mo. 444
(1870).
18
Van Alstine v. McCarty, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 326 (1868).
14
Farnham v. Chapman, 60 Vt. 338, 14 A. 690 (1888); Buchanan v. Kauffman
& Runge, 65 Tex. 235 (1885); De Witt v. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298, 16 N. W. 656
(1883); Kelly v. Forty-Second St., M. & St. N. Ave. R. R., 37 App. Div. 500, 55
N. Y. S. 1096 (1899).
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case of Morgan v. Winston,15 the Tennessee court stated that the judgment against the vendor of a slave was not even admissible in evidence
in his suit against his vendor. The language of the court might be considered dictum, however, since, at the end of the opinion, the court said
that even if it were wrong in its theory, still "the defendant was not
notified, and required to defend," so that the former adjudication could
not be conclusive in any event. The principal argument of the court to
differentiate that case from cases of breach of warranty of title of chattels, where it is well settled that the former adjudication is conclusive,
is that soundness at a different time is a collateral fact, not connected
with a direct material issue, since the quality of goods is subject to constant change, whereas a title, being an absolute and static thing, is unaffected by the mere passage of time. This argument seems uncon~
vincing. For title, too, may not remain stationary, and a defect therein
. may arise or disappear between the two sales, e.g., in estoppel by deed
or adverse possession cases. If the argument has validity in cases where
the unfitness is itself the product of time, i.e., deterioration, it would
seem to have none in cases where faulty manufacture is established in
the original litigation or in the typical food case where the goods remain
in a sealed container the entire time they are in the retailer's possession.
In the very similar South Carolina case of Smith & Melton v.
Moore,16 a case where both suits were for breach of implied warranty
of soundness of cotton, the doctrine was again found inapplicable. The
former judgment was held to be not even prima facie proof of any fact
in issue, and plaintiff was nonsuited. Two new arguments appear in this
case. One is the concept that a judgment itself affects the title but not the
soundness of a chattel, so that it is admissible in warranty of title cases
only. Such a doctrine is questionable. It is hard to see why a judgment
can be said to create a status rather than simply to declare an existing
status in the case where title instead of soundness is in issue. The principal distinction between the title issue and the soundness issue is that
the former depends more often on an issue of law than one of fact, but
that should be no reason for saying that a law judgment ( as opposed to
an equity decree for partition, specific performance, quieting of title,
rescission, reformation of a deed, etc.) actually passes or creates a title.
The other argument of the court in the Smith case is that the title warranty is not a promise of good title but a promise to defend the title,
so that the original vendor has contracted to come in and participate as
a party and be bound by the judgment. But this argument forgets that
the original vendee is suing for failure to pass title, not for failure to
defend title. Otherwise he could prevail only if he could demonstrate
that he would have won the first suit if his vendor had come in and
15

32 Tenn. 47 (1852).

16

7 S. C. 209 (1875).
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defended the action for him; and even then he would probably lose,
since his duty to mitigate should have compelled him to defend with
equal competency himself.
The third such case denying the applicability of res judicata was the
Kansas case of Booth v. Scheer,11 involving two suits for breach of
warranty of soundness of a stallion. The court admitted the evidence
(unlike the court in the Morgan case), but held it inconclusive, so that
a jury verdict for defendant was sustained. The court predicated its
decision on the fact that warranties do not run with chattels,18 an
untenable argument in view of the following facts: (I) in all these
cases each purchaser is suing on his own vendor's separate warranty;
( 2) since warranties of title similarly do not run with chattels,1° the
theory offers no basis for distinction between soundness and title cases.
Concurring only on grounds of stare decisis, one judge saw the fallacy
in the court's reasoning, observing that the problem of the running of
warranties is involved only in suits by the ultimate buyer against the
original seller. Another new argument suggested in the opinion is the
notion that soundness is largely a matter of opinion and hence there is
a greater likelihood of two juries disagreeing in soundness cases than
in title cases. But this possibility of one jury's making a mistake would
seem rather to militate in favor of the application of res judicata, for
it is never desirable that the ultimate burden should fall on the intermediate purchaser, since logically the juries should agree and the loss
should fall either on the original vendor or on the ultimate buyer.
The only case in point holding squarely the other way is the New
York case of Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co.,20 in which both suits
were brought for breach of contract in failing to deliver oil of merchantable quality and the original vendor was held liable after notice to
defend. The former judgment was held "admissible" to show the oil
to be unmerchantable. At another point the court says, "It did . • •
establish the fact that the oil . . . was unmerchantable." Thus it is
impossible to tell from the opinion whether the judgment was held to
be conclusive or only prima facie proof. But there is good reason to
distinguish this case, since the time factor was not present here, the
original buyer having shipped to his consignee at the latter's risk immediately on receipt, so that delivery in both cases occurred at substantially the same time and hence no change could have taken place in
17

105 Kan. 643, 185 P. 898 (1919).
Post v. Burnham, (C. C. A. 3d, 1897) 83 F. 79; Bordwell v. Collie, 45 N. Y.
494 (1871); Fulton Bank v. Mathers, 183 Iowa 226, 166 N. W. I050 (1918).
19
Salle v. Light's Exr., 4 Ala. 700 (1843); Smith v. Williams, II7 Ga. 782, 45
S. E. 394 (1903); Asher Lumber Co. v. Cornett, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 569, 58 S. W. 438
(1900). Contra, Boyd v. Whitfield, 19 Ark. 447 (1858).
20
149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422 (1896) (quotation from 149 N. Y. at 152).
18
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the goods through the passage of time. But such an attempt to reconcile
this case with the three previous cases breaks down when we consider
that in the Booth (stallion) case it was specifically found in the original
suit that no change in the condition of the animal took place between
the two sales, though it is difficult to see how that issue could have
arisen or been essential to a determination of the prior suit.
One other New York case might be used as authority for application
of the doctrine of res judicata. In Butterworth & Sons Co. v. B. F.
Sturtevant Co. 21 defendant furnished plaintiff a guaranteed machine
which plaintiff resold. The machine was faulty, and plaintiff repaired
it at defendant's expense, losing a judgment to his vendee for damages
for delay while fixing the machine and making it fit for use. In the
second action the defense was contributory negligence. The court held
that the judgment would be competent evidence to prove the inadequacy of the machine so that some delay was needed to repair it. But
since defendant had already admitted the inadequacy and the sole issue
was on whom lay the fault for the additional delay, the evidence was
held irrelevant and inadmissible.
It may not be amiss here to mention one of the cases concerning the
situation where the chattel is not resold but its defect causes personal
injury to a third person who sues and recovers from the buyer for
negligent failure to inspect or for furnishing an unsafe chattel. In
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Co.,22 the buyer of a
, scale in this situation successfully sued the seller for breach of warranty
of fitness, and the first judgment was held to determine conclusively
the vendee's liability to the injured person and hence to show the unfitness of the machine and the amount of the damages. But this line
of cases verges on the questions of pari delicto and right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors, etc., which are not the topic of this comment.
What then may be said to be the state of the law in the light of the
five reported cases on ·breach of warranty of resold chattels?
A. As to the weight of the judgment as evidence: one case says
that the evidence is inadmissible; 23 one says that it is admissible but that
it is not enough in itself to support a verdict; 24 one says that it establishes a prima facie case but is rebuttable; 25 one says that it is conclusive; 26 and one case seems to say that it is conclusive if all the issues in
176 App. Div. 528, 163 N. Y. S. 314 (1917).
322 Mo. 502, 15 S. W. (2d) 766 (1929). See also Hoskins v. Hotel Randolph Co., 203 Iowa u52, 2u N. W. 423 (1927).
28 Morgan v. Winston, 32 Tenn. 47 (1852).
24 Smith & Melton v. Moore, 7 S. C. 209 (1875).
25 Booth v. Scheer, 105 Kan. 643, 185 P. 898 (1919).
26 Butterworth & Sons Co. v. B. F. Sturtevant Co., 176 App. Div. 528, 163 N. Y.
s. 314 (1917).
21
22
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the second suit were involved in the :first suit, but otherwise it is only
prima facie evidence.27 This last alternative seems to forget that the
doctrine of res judicata can be applied to single specific issues by way of
collateral estoppel as well as to entire suits by way of bar.28
B. As to when the judgment will be conclusive: to reconcile the
cases and to answer this question we must remember that the basic
argument of the decisions denying the application of the rule was the
possibility of the chattel's being of di:fferent soundness at the times of
the two sales. Hence if we eliminate this factor only the dictum of the
concurring judge in the Booth case stands in the way of reconciliation.
Thus we may surmise the law to be that the former judgment is conclusive ( r) if the two sales took place at substantially the same time,
or ( 2) if the defect was found in the :first case to be one in the process
of manufacture, or (3) if the goods are of a kind not subject to deterioration or to defectiveness through mishandling in transportation
and the goods could never have been taken out of their container by
the retailer.
If none of these three fact situations can be found to exist, the doctrine of res judicata will probably be held not to apply on the basis of
the Morgan, Smith, and Booth cases. But even so it is hard to see why
the judgment should not be held admissible for some purposes.29 For
example, one might argue that the judgment should be conclusive of
the fact that the goods were defective at the date of the second sale and
thus throw on the manufacturer the burden of showing that the defect
arose in the interval between the two sales. 8° Further, it should at least
be conclusive that the retailer had no other defenses to the :first suit,
that he complied with his duty to mitigate damages, and that the retailer's damages are the amount of the :first judgment ( so long as he
can show that there was no change in the condition of the chattel in the
interval between the two sales). And, from a practical standpoint, it is
hard to see why the prior adjudication should not always be admissible
at least as prima facie evidence on the basic issues of breach of warranty and amount of the damages, its probative or persuasive force depending on the length of the period between the two sales, the durable
27

Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422 (1896).
Bryson v. International Indemnity Co., 88 Cal. App. 100, 262 P. 790 (1928);
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N. Y. 461,
31 N. E. 987 (1892).
29
If it is not conclusive, a judgment in a suit between other parties involving the
same issues is generally held inadmissible. 4 WrGMORE, EvmENCE, 3d ed., § 1346a
(1940); 5 id., § 1671a. Wigmore, however, disapproves of this rule.
80
But since the retailer had possession of the chattel in the interval, he would
ordinarily know more about what had happened in that period to make it defective;
hence it might be more practical to place the burden on him.
28
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qualities of the chattel, the nature of the defect, and the way in which
the chattel was handled in the interval between sales.
Suppose we have a case like Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co.,
satisfying the requirements for the application of res judicata. What
issues then will be concluded by the judgment? The courts are not
helpful in this respect, since they usually say merely that the adjudication is conclusive of the fact that plaintiff was liable to his vendee.81
Clearly this issue per se does not arise in the second case. The issues on
which the prior judgment will be conclusive are thus those issues involved in the second suit which were also necessarily determined by the
first court in deciding that the retailer was liable to his customer. Hence
the first case may be said to determine conclusively that the chattel was
defective 82 (i.e., that the manufacturer breached his warranty if the
warranties were identical or if the manufacturer's warranty was broader
than the retailer's), that the retailer had no other defenses,83 (i.e., that
the retailer's duty to mitigate damages was fulfilled), and that he was
damaged in that amount. 84 This leaves the retailer to establish the
existence of the warranty, the consideration therefor, and the performance of all conditions.85
One other caveat, never mentioned in the cases, should be added. If
one of the suits is brought on an affirmance theory and the other on a
disaffirmance or rescission theory, the first suit will not be conclusive of
the amount of the damages. In a suit brought on a rescission theory, the
purchase price will be added to the amount of personal or property
damage sustained. If brought on an affirmance theory, the difference
between the actual value and the value it would have had if it had been
sound as warranted or represented must be added to personal or property damage.36 Thus also if both suits are brought on a disaffirmance
theory, there will still be a difference in the amount of the damages if
31 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S. W.
(2d) 766 (1929); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola,
134 N. Y. 461, 31 N. E. 987 (1892).
82 Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co., 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422 (1896).
83 Grand Forks v. Paulsness, 19 N. D. 293, 123 N. W. 878 (1909).
84 Smith v. Ayrault, 71 Mich. 475, 39 N. W. 724 (1888); Littleton v. Richard-·
son, 34 N. H. 179 (1856); Estep v. Bailey, 94 Ore. 59, 185 P. 227 (1919). The
judgment is also conclusive of the fact that plaintiff in the first action was not guilty of
contributory negligence, Milford v. Holbrook, 91 Mass. 17 (1864); Boston v. Worthington, 76 Mass. 496 (1858), and that the injury was not caused by the intervening
act of a stranger, Byne v. Americus, 6 Ga. App. 48, 64 S. E. 285 (1909).
85 But it was said in New York Title & Mtg. Co. v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
187 App. Div. 537, 175 N. Y. S. 763 (1919), that res judicata can ouly be applied
when the ultimate liability of the defendant in the second suit is conceded.
86 See McCORMICK, DAMAGES 448-454 (1935) (misrepresentation) and id., 672679 (breach of warranty). Suits brought for negligence can, of· course, be predicated
only on a disaffirmance theory.
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the purchase price was different in the two sales. But, in any event, the
first suit should be conclusive at least on one element of damages, i.e.,
the amount of personal or property damages. And since this will very
often be the only element of damages in the case, the whole problem
may be largely academic.
It must be observed that in all the reported cases in point on resale
of defective chattels, both suits were brought as causes of action for
breach of warranty. While much has been written about the meaning of
the word "warranty" in sales cases and about whether actions for breach
of warranty sound in contract or in tort,87 it is now fairly well settled
that such actions are brought for damages for failure to perform a
promise.88 Although the theory of many of the modern cases of personal
injury from defective chattels, such as Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,89 is
uncertain (it may be fraud, negligence, absolute liability, negligent advertising, breach of warranty, or breach of promise in failing to deliver
the designated type of goods 40 ) , this uncertainty has usually arisen
solely in direct suits by the consumer against the manufacturer, in which
case no res judicata problem will arise. While it is true that the doctrine
of notice and opportunity to defend has been occasionally employed by
the plaintiff rather than the defendant in the original suit,41 such cases
where the consumer sues the manufacturer after suing the retailer are
beyond the scope of this comment. The problem of estoppel there is
ordinarily different in character, since it depends not so much on the
doctrine of notice and opportunity to defend as on the doctrine of res
judicata against persons who "openly and avowedly" take over the
conduct of the defense.
Suppose that both suits are not brought on a breach of warranty
theory but one or both is instead brought on a cause of action for negligence or misrepresentation. Assuming the possibility of any of these
three bases being used, there are thus nine possible combinations or pairs
of theories on which the two cases may be brought, of which we have
dealt with only one. In these other eight situations, there are no applicable decisions, but in what way should the results vary?
Regardless of the theories on which the suits are brought, the first
suit should be res judicata on the fact that the retailer was liable to his
vendee,42 that he had no other defenses,48 the amount of the damages,4 4
87
I WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 197 (1924). A warranty in different fields of
the law may be a promise, a condition, a representation, or mere words.
88
1 WILLISTON, SALES, 2d ed., § 197 (1924).
89
168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 15 P. (2d) 1118 (1932).
40
See Leidy, "Another New Tort?" 38 MicH. L. REv. 964 (1940).
41
Lawrason v. Owners' Automobile Ins. Co., 172 La. 1075, 136 So. 57 (1931).
Contra, Gist v. Davis, 2 Hill Eq. (S. C.) 335 (1835).
43
42
44
See note 31, supra.
See note 33, supra.
See note 34, supra.
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and the defectiveness of the chattel.45 If both suits are brought on a fraud
theory or one on a fraud and one on a warranty theory, the first judgment should also conclusively determine the fact that the representation, if such was made, was material and false or that the warranty, if
such was made, was breached--so long as the two warranties or representations were identical or the manufacturer's was broader than the
retailer's. If the second suit is brought for negligence and the first for
fraud or breach of warranty, the fact that the defect was the proximate
cause of the injury should be conclusively determined by the prior
judgment, though plaintiff must still show that the defect was caused
by the act of negligence, if such negligence can be established. But if
the first suit was also brought on a negligence theory, causation would
not be shown; in fa~t, it might be argued that the first suit is conclusive
of the fact that defendant's negligent act was not the cause of the injury,
since by usual tort law, an intervening negligent act is often said to
isolate the defendant's negligence and break the causal chain.46 Or we
might instead say that the first suit conclusively established plaintiff's
contributory negligence and so bars the second suit, unless we are in a
state which employs a comparative negligence theory.41 No such cases
have been recorded where it is the defendant in the second suit who
seeks thus to take advantage of the doctrine of res judicata by notice to
defend, and it would be dangerous to permit it to be done. For if it
were allowed, he would be able merely to answer the notice, appear and
take over the defense, admit the negligence of his vendee ( defendant in
the case), lose the suit, and thus immunize himself from later litigation.
If the first suit is brought on a negligence theory, regardless of the
theory on which the second suit is brought, the fact of defectiveness at
the time of the original sale should be concluded by the first judgment
so long as the defect itself was not caused by the plaintiff in the second
suit, e.g., if the negligence proved was failure to inspect or repair. But
the fact that the first suit was one for negligence might prevent the
amount of damages awarded by the first judgment from being conclusive in the second suit, for the retailer's negligence, while no bar to his
second suit for fraud or breach of warranty, would quite possibly require
the doctrine of the duty to mitigate 48 to be invoked against him; or
45

See note 3 2, supra.
Thomas v. Quartermaine, L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 685 (1887); PROSSER, ToRTS 364
(1941).
47 Ga. Code Ann. (1941), § 105-603. See Savannah Electric Co. v. Crawford,
130 Ga. 421, 60 S. E. 1056 (1908). But even where contributory negligence is a
complete bar, as in most states, the manufacturer will be liable to the retailer for the
decreased value of the chattel caused by the defect, since the retailer's own negligence
had no bearing on this element of the damages.
48
1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., 386-388 (1912).
46
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conceivably the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale 49 against allowing speculative or unforeseeable damages might be employed on the theory that
intervening negligent acts are not foreseeable. 50
There are certain objections to the applicability of res judicata
against persons liable over in general which are particularly cogent in
the case of resale of defective chattels. For example, the rule really
places the manufacturer in a dilemma: (a) If he does not respond to the
notice, the suit may be badly defended by a disinterested defendant who
knows that he can obtain reimbursement and he may suffer in consequence when such defendant sues him, even though such defendant
should have prevailed in the original litigation. He is protected where
plaintiff and defendant act fraudulently,5 1 but he is not protected where
the original defendant handles the defense in a careless manner. (b)
On the other hand, if the person liable over does appear and defend, he
may be made a party by the original plaintiff as a joint tortfeasor or be
otherwise estopped by the judgment in a later suit by such plaintiff,
according to the rule that one who "openly and avowedly" takes over
the defense is bound by the judgment as if he were a party.52 This
would often be true in cases of resale of chattels, since the only reason
the consumer customarily sues the retailer rather than the manufacturer
in the first place is that the latter is ordinarily less accessible.
Another complication arises in these cases. Defendant may give
notice to his vendor and yet still participate in the trial and refuse to let
him take over the defense. The rule is that if defendant fails to use a
good defense offered by his vendor the bar does not operate.53 But is
such protection adequate? It leaves it to a second court to determine
49
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). See l SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed.,
263-266 (1912).
50
In Fort Worth Grain & Elevator Co. v. Walker Grain Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 168 S. W. 470, the original seller was interpleaded in the first suit and judgment was rendered for the same amount against each defendant on his own warranty.
Pending appeal after the judgment, the original purchaser settled by compromise with
the plaintiff, his vendee, for an amount much smaller than the judgment. The original
vendor, who had refused to compromise, appealed from the judgment, and it was held
that he was not entitled to the benefit of the favorable compromise made by his purchaser but was liable for the entire amount of the judgment originally awarded against
him.
51
Pezel v. Yerex, 56 Cal. App. 304, 205 P. 475 (1922); Gerber v. Kansas City,
311 Mo. 49,277 S. W. 562 (1926); New Orleans v. Gaines' Admr., 138 U.S. 595,
II S. Ct. 428 (1890).
52
Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. l (1865); Beyer Co. v. Fleischmann Co., (C. C.
A. 6th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 465; Dicks Press Guard Mfg. Co. v. Bowen, (D. C. N. Y.
1916) 229 F. 193.
53
Seattle v. Northern Pacific R. R., 47 Wash. 552, 92 P. 4n (1907); appeal
from new trial, 63 Wash. 129, II4 P. 1038 (19u). Similarly the rule does not apply
if defendant was refused the right to aid in any way in the defense of the former action.
City of Lewiston v. Isaman, 19 Idaho 653, PS P. 494 (19n).
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whether a defense not offered in the first court would have been held
valid by that first court. The second court has, of course, no way of
determining the effectiveness of such defense until it ascertains what
reply it would have brought from the original plaintiff, who is not a
party before the court. And the rule ignores the personal factor. Who
can tell whether a court which held a defense to be bad would have still
held it ineffectual if it had been argued more persuasively by a more
interested party?
One other argument, though a somewhat legalistic one, might appear against the application of res judicata in these cases, though it is
never mentioned by the authorities. This is, that by the doctrine of
mutuality,54 the person liable over should not be bound unless the
plaintiff in the first case would be bound if that case had been decided
the other way. If the original defendant prevails in the first action,
the person liable over will not win the second suit because of the doctrine of res judicata but only by virtue of the fact that only nominal
damages have been sustained by the plaintiff in the second suit. 55 But
this argument is not persuasive since: (I) the important thing is that
the second defendant will not in fact lose this suit if the first suit goes
the other way; (2) the courts are always more anxious to apply res
judicata against than in favor of a nonparty; 56 and (3) as in the fie!ds
of consideration57 and specific performance,58 the doctrine of mutuality
in the field of res judicata has been criticized59 and many exceptions to
the rule have been developed.60
As a matter of salutary policy, there would seem to be strong reason
for applying the doctrine of res judicata to these cases of resale of defective chattels. The manufacturer almost invariably knows more about
the product, what would cause it to become defective, how it was ma.de,
and what it is worth, than does his vendee.61 Thus there would seem to
be good reason to require him to appear in the first suit or suffer the
54 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32
S. Ct. 641 (1912).
55 Plaintiff is always entitled to at least nominal damages for breach of contract,
even where he has sustained no actual loss. See I SEDGWICK, DAMAGES, 9th ed., § 106
(1912). Perhaps the doctrine of mutuality does apply to this :field, or rather would be
applied if the problem ever arose. But since, a prevailing defendant will never sue the
person liable over to him, it is safe to say that the question will never be adjudicated.
56 See 40 MICH, L. REv. 307 (1941).
57 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 504-508 (1936).
58 WALSH, EQUITY 341-356 (1930).
59 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., (D. C. N. J. 1940) 32
F. Supp. 304.
60 Notably in cases of derivative liability. See Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) 158 F. 63.
61 See Brown, "The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products," 23
MINN, L. REv. 585 (1939).
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consequences rather than to let the loss fall on the retailer through the
latter's ignorance. And if he does appear it is certainly proper to bind
him, so that he will not conduct the defense in haphazard fashion or
experiment 152 by trying out di:fferent defenses in the two suits, not
pleading his perfect defense in the first case in the hope of winning that
litigation without divulging facts that for business reasons he would
prefer to keep secret. Logically the loss should ultimately fall on either
the consumer or the manufacturer, except in cases where the retailer is
guilty of some independent fault ( such as negligence) or voluntarily
assumes greater obligations than did his vendor ( such as making a warranty or representation which his vendor did not make to him). And
such defenses will always be open to the manufacturer in any event,
since res judicata will never be applied to these issues.1!11
What then is the answer to the question propounded at the beginning of this comment? Enough has been written to show that there is
no complete answer. Surely there is at least sufficient doubt under the
decisions so that the retailer, when sued, should serve on his vendor
notice to defend in the hope that the second court will hold the doctrine
applicable. Three fact situations have been indicated in which, in the
light of the cases, a court would probably estop the manufacturer as to
certain issues, and it has been demonstrated to what extent the issues
concluded should depend on the theories on which the two suits are
brought. It has been suggested that even if res judicata is deemed inapplicable, the former judgment might be allowed as admissible evidence regarding certain issues. But unless it is in itself considered at
least sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, it would be hard
to justify its admissibility despite the notice to defend, since its value as
mere cumulative evidence would not appear great enough to warrant
the confusion resulting from the introduction of such a collateral issue.

David N. Mills

See von Moschzisker, "Res Judicata," 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1929).
Rogers v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch., 275 Mich. 374, 266 N. W. 386
(1936); Missouri K. & T. R. R. v. Ellis, 78 Okla. 150, 189 P. 363 (1920); Grant v.
Maslen, 151 Mich. 466, ll5 N. W. 472 (1908).
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